Lost in translation by Bondi, Liz & Davidson, Joyce
Lost in translation

Liz Bondi (The University of Edinburgh, Scotland) 
and 
Joyce Davidson (Queen’s University, Ontario)

“As I have become more and more ensconced in academia, following its rules and learning to speak its second language, I have always been aware that I -- and all the things, and perhaps even people, I am, are lost in its translation.” (Prince, forthcoming)

As Steve Pile (2010) notes, emotions and affect have attracted much attention in human geography in recent years. That the emergent field stimulates attempts to map out key strands and to identify areas of disagreement and of silence is no surprise. Pile’s own contribution seeks to clarify similarities and differences between the concepts of emotion and affect, and to bring what he construes as two separate and internally coherent traditions – emotional geography and affectual geography – into a new kind of relationship, for which he enrolls, inter alia, some ideas drawn from psychoanalysis. In this response we argue against the attempt to definitively pin down the concepts (which we think should remain) in question. We suggest that efforts to delineate sharp and stable conceptual boundaries around and between emotion and affect are misplaced, and entail a form of categorical violence that risks killing the unstable subjects so many – and so very different – geographers are struggling to keep alive. In choosing our words here, we are at pains to express our intentions carefully, given that language never simply or somehow neutrally represents, but rather, intervenes, affects, represents and (re)constructs. Understanding and working with this performative nature of language is, we suggest, crucial to the health and development of emotional and affectual geographies. 

Distinctions and categories are the stock-in-trade of academics, often necessarily so, as we attempt to clarify and specify, to pick our way towards insight and explanation. But sometimes – perhaps increasingly in human geography – the ideas and the entities with which we engage are inherently amorphous and elusive. Emotions, feelings and affects present us with messy matters to work with; they are tough to “see”, hard to hold, even trickier to “write up” (Bondi 2005a). But this is the nature of the beasts; they are alive and lively subjects that resist our attempts to pacify, examine, and make presentable (so suitably precise) for an academic public. Emotions and affects might thus be considered disagreeable in many ways, but their rough edges, the very wildness that frustrates domestication is precisely what gives them such power. We would suggest that working with rather than against these contrary characteristics can temper the reduction associated with clear categorization, and that managing our own anxiety around unruly subjects may be more productive than eliminating its source. Indeed one of the inspirations for explicit engagement with emotion and affect has been appreciation of the importance for geography of acknowledging and exploring the intrinsic messiness of what we do and know (Jones 2008; Law 2004; Longhurst et al. 2008). Following the insights of one philosopher of language, we suggest that vague and fuzzy concepts are, depending of course on context, often more useful than clear ones: in Wittgenstein’s (1981, §71) words, “Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn’t the indistinct one often exactly what we need?” Insofar as is possible, we reflect the importance of such contextual and conceptual imprecision in the journal we edit; Emotion, Space and Society draws no exclusionary lines around its key subjects, and seeks to “encourage investigations of feelings and affect in various spatial and social contexts, environments and landscapes”. 
 
When the concepts of emotion and affect are subject to sharp-edged definition, claims about them become problematic in a whole variety of ways. Inevitably, and notwithstanding Pile’s acknowledgment of areas of overlap, a dualistic framing is produced and perpetuated. Such characterization inevitably suggests that emotion and affect should each be understood in terms of what the other is not, which is to say, they become positioned oppositionally, and in analytically familiar terms of lack (see, for example, Rose 1993). In portraying such differentiation, it is not always entirely clear to us where Pile expresses his own opinion and where he conveys that of another, but in any case, the definitive accounts and models presented in his piece, including for example, the “layer-cake” (p. 9), rarely resonate with our own sense of how the concepts he discusses are used in practice: use and context are key. Perhaps this disconnect is an inescapable outcome of separation from original (research and writing) background, but, for example, the nine point list of affect’s distinctive features (p. 8) raises more questions for us than it answers. In response to the claims that affect “has potential” (point 6) and “can be manipulated” (point 9) we would ask what it means to suggest that emotion doesn’t and can’t. Perhaps more problematically from our point of view, Pile claims (point 2) that “affect is not simply personal or interpersonal (along the lines of emotional geography’s conception of emotion)”. We cannot know which sources Pile has in mind here, but his account of emotion’s (transpersonal) limits does not ring true to the literature with which we are familiar. Towards the end of Pile’s essay, he draws on some ideas from psychoanalytic geographies to assert a reconceptualisation of emotions intended to get beyond the limitations listed above. Having done so, he claims that “emotions no longer belong exclusively to any individual […] Emotions, now, lie between individuals, and between individuals and perceptual environments” (p. 13). This is, however, a very strange assertion, given that widely cited early interventions in what has become known as emotional geographies made the case for studying emotion precisely because of its potential for offering important new insights into relationships between and among people and environments (Anderson and Smith, 2001; Widdowfield 2000). In our own work, we repeatedly highlight the need to study “emotional intersections between people, and between people and places” (as specified in the aims of Emotion, Space and Society) and we stress the need to resist representing emotion as a bounded or locatable “object”, whether “internal”, “personal” or otherwise (Bondi et al. 2005; Davidson 2003; Smith et al. 2009). While we agree that ideas from psychoanalytic theories and practices are among the conceptual resources that might be helpful (Bondi 2005b; Pardy 2011), we strongly contest the primacy of any single theoretical or philosophical tradition and rather welcome the diverse range of borrowings that inform contributions to this (and closely related) fields of research.

To give one more example of the dangers of asserting definitive difference, Pile claims (point 8) that “representations of affect can only ever fail to represent affect itself”, suggesting that emotion is more readily representable (although we should, he asserts, also be “suspicious of” and try to “avoid” such representations). His point is underlined elsewhere, when he writes: “Like emotions, affects matter – but they cannot be grasped, made known or represented” (p. 9), which surely implies that emotions can. We wonder if this curious interpretation might stem from Pile’s sense that emotional geographers are primarily concerned with “expressed emotion”, a term he repeats on several occasions, and which he appears to equate with what people assumed to be “open, honest and genuine” (p. 8) say about their emotional life. (Although this claim is at times attributed to others, it seems to be one with which Pile would agree). This not only imputes an extraordinary and essential naivety to all those contributing to emotional geographies, but represents an exceptionally narrow definition of the field. Were this to be considered an accurate rendition, our own work (for example Bondi 2005a; Davidson 2003) as well as much of the content of Emotion, Space and Society would appear to lie outside the field of emotional geographies. As we have already noted, language – whether spoken or written – is always performative. Who, we wonder, treats spoken accounts as transparent (or “Truthful”) representations of emotion, affect, or indeed anything else (and what would this even mean)? And who would equate expressions of emotions with spoken words to the apparent exclusion of manifold forms of non-verbal communication, whether, for example, aural, visual or haptic? 

Whatever we consciously seek to communicate when we write, our words escape our intentions and are available to interpretations which we cannot (and generally would not want to) control. So to complain that we have been mis-read would be churlish. Instead we argue that a core theme within the broad field of emotional and affectual geographies should continue to engage with the performativity of language. Language is always creative and this applies to the writings of academics as much as to the conversations that constitute some kinds of fieldwork. A responsibility that flows from this performativity is to consider the manifold “work” that our words do. In this context, the risk that our writing does harm has long generated discussion (Mohanty 1988; Spivak 1994). Our words necessarily “translate” ideas and experiences from one context to another, and we need to consider the impacts and implications of such translations on experiential phenomena that should always be understood relationally, and in context. We are at pains to emphasize that efforts to pin down ideas and experiences too precisely necessarily decontextualises them, and cuts away the meaning-making, meaning-giving richness that flows from the very contexts excluded.

Such cutting does violence, and this is acknowledged in often painstaking debates about the ethics of representation (Ribbens and Edwards 1998; Wolf 1996). Perhaps more eloquently and evocatively, Dawn Eddings Prince (forthcoming) describes the violence of much academic language in an autoethnographic account of her experience of the autism spectrum:

For me, language was blended inextricably to context and memory. This melding represented the most important thing in the world, and everything, from bathrooms to snails, to dogs, had language. […] Academic writing serves to empty the fullness of the thing it seeks to unequivocally contain.  It kills the patient in its very prescription.  A cutting thing, a surgery of words, it makes the many into one rather than loaning itself to the cause of connection.

Making the many into one is another unfortunate risk associated with Pile’s project. That is to say, an inevitable consequence of his dualistic framing and delineation of emotion and affect is a rendering of associated fields of research not only as cut off from each other, but also as internally homogeneous. Rendered thus, they become unrecognisable. For example, according to Pile (p. 10) “emotional geographers want to talk directly to people about their personal feelings and affectual geographers don’t”. Somewhat taken aback by this, we ask: is this true of all of them, all of the time? To refer to a singular emotional or affectual (or indeed psychoanalytic) “geography” is surely to enlist straw persons and positions that over-simplify and polarize subtle and complex debates. We would likewise resist the imposition of a singular space for engagement, as in Pile’s reference to “The debate between emotional and affectual geographies” (p. 13, emphasis added), or indeed any defining sense of distinction. For in Pile’s terms: “[t]he fundamental difference between emotional and affectual geography lies in the split between ‘the thought’ and ‘affect’, as mirrored in the split between the cognitive and the non-cognitive” (p. 12, emphasis added). This kind of statement reiterates and re-circulates a longstanding conceptualisation that many whose work he cites struggle to resist. In reinstating such distinctions, Pile risks delimiting how the terms emotion and affect ought to be used. Such prescriptions sit uneasily with the commitment of many contributors to the fields of emotional and affectual geographies to unsettle and extend the limits of academic knowledge. Boundaries are surely meant to be messed with; they deserve to be treated with a healthy dose of skepticism rather than rigidity or respect. Perhaps of particular concern here, that between mind and body has long been subject to such disruption (Longhurst 2001), despite Pile’s puzzling claims about its continuing hold on the discipline (p. 14). 

This has not been an easy piece to write. We each read Pile’s essay with what might be described as mixed feelings. For both of us, much of what we are most passionate about in the writings that have become known as emotional and affectual geographies appears to have been lost in the acts of translation, from original context to this one, from others’ language to Pile’s. We are of course aware that there may be equally substantial losses in our own translation of Pile, which risks misrepresenting his motivations and aims as well as the sense of his words. 
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